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Abstract 
This article examines the long-term dynamics among a best-practice risk management frame-
work, risk management technologies and the translation of uncertainties into risks by using a 
longitudinal case study of a large mega-project. We show that the framework and technolo-
gies through the visual power of inscriptions and the purifying work of risk consultants as 
experts establish the boundaries of the forms of uncertainties that are accepted and included as 
risks. We term the accepted and included risks ‘pure risks’ and the risks excluded after disa-
greement ‘impure risks’. We also show that the construction of impure risks challenges the 
predictions of the framework causing a false sense of security for the project objectives, and 
that the continuous readjustment of technologies, in particular, is necessary to ensure the 
long-term realisation of these predictions. Finally, this article contributes to the literature on 
performativity by showing how technologies serve as buffers to shield failing economic 
frameworks against criticism. 
 
Keywords: risk management, uncertainty, performativity, purification, inscriptions, visualisa-
tion 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the concept of risk management has become increasingly im-
portant for governments and companies alike, transforming the management of organisations 
and influencing everyday work routines (Hayne & Free, 2014; Kaplan et al., 2009; Power, 
2016b). One of the latest developments has been the worldwide application of risk manage-
ment frameworks and technologies to the management of mega-projects in the public sector. 
Such projects have acquired an infamy borne from their tendency to go both over time and 
over budget (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). As one attempt to temper this ten-
dency, governments have increasingly turned to insisting that risk management frameworks 
and associated technologies form part of the project management process. So far, however, 
we know little of the long-term dynamics of such frameworks and technologies (Jordan et al., 
2016). How do they help represent and organise ‘the work of risk’ (Power, 2016a, p. 276)? To 
what extent do they assist with the broader objective of curbing the years of cost overruns on 
projects? 
 
This article examines the long-term dynamics of risk management frameworks and technolo-
gies related to the translation of uncertainties into risks. Our study is informed by Michel Cal-
lon’s performativity thesis (Callon, 1998c, 2007; Callon et al., 2009) and Bruno Latour’s con-
ceptual work on purification and inscriptions (Latour, 1986, 1987, 1993). The performativity 
thesis argues that theories, frameworks and technologies produce the worlds that they de-
scribe (Callon, 1998b). This concept allows us to approach the construction of risks as the 
process of making risks more like the prescription of frameworks and technologies. It also 
allows us to approach the construction of risks as a process in which frameworks and technol-
ogies themselves interact with other actors and undergo change. This article thus represents 
one of the few performativity studies to describe the efforts over time associated with actual-
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ising and re-actualising an (economic) framework. It contributes to the current debate on risk 
management frameworks and technologies (Hall & Fernando, 2016; Jordan et al., 2013, 2016; 
Kalthoff, 2005, 2011; Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2009; Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014) by reveal-
ing the long-term complex dynamics of these for the work of translating uncertainties into 
risks. 
 
The article also contributes to extant studies on risk experts (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2011) 
and the visual nature of accounting inscriptions (Busco & Quattrone, 2015, 2017; Jordan et 
al., 2016; Pollock & D'Adderio, 2012; Quattrone, 2009). We make this contribution by show-
ing the long-term effects of the experts’ attempt to define the boundaries of risk construction 
using a series of interrelated risk management technologies. These technologies enable the 
production of inscriptions that visualise the criteria for the construction of risks and perform 
the cognitive boundaries of the risk management participants (Latour, 1986). These inscrip-
tions frame the visual performable space of the practice (Busco & Quattrone, 2015), but a 
visual performable space that also distorts performance and leads to endless reframing efforts 
in ‘a continuous process of search for perfection’ (Busco & Quattrone, 2017, p. 16). Because 
‘perfection’ has already been pre-defined by the framework being relied on, however, this 
continuous search becomes one in which experts exclude all ‘imperfect’ representations of 
risks. 
 
Our study is based on a longitudinal case study of risk management in Denmark. We report 
findings from the Signalling Programme, a 3.2-billion-euro programme of replacing all rail-
way signalling systems across Denmark. The Signalling Programme is one of the largest and 
most expensive public projects in recent Danish history. Our overarching interest in this pro-
ject stemmed from it being the first attempt in Denmark to implement contemporary best-
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practice risk management on a large public infrastructure project (Transportministeriet, 2008). 
It relies on the part of the Project Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge framework that 
concerns risk management, which approximately 40 per cent of all organisations across coun-
tries, sectors and industries apply to manage projects (PwC, 2012). Integral to the Signalling 
Programme is an ambitious and comprehensive IT-based risk management control system. 
This system combines a series of risk management technologies, including a risk matrix/map, 
a risk register, as well as Monte Carlo simulations. The Signalling Programme offers a fasci-
nating case through which to study the performativity of risk management frameworks and 
technologies. 
 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reprises the accounting literature on 
risk management, with a focus on frameworks, technologies and the construction of risks. 
Section 3 outlines Michel Callon’s performativity thesis and introduces Bruno Latour’s con-
ceptual work on purification and inscriptions. In Section 4, we describe our research method. 
Section 5 presents our case material, which we divide into a range of subsections. Section 6 
discusses the implications of our findings and Section 7 concludes the article. 
 
2. Frameworks, technologies and risk construction 
In light of the proliferation of risk management, the literature has looked into risk manage-
ment frameworks, the technologies they promote and the everyday risk work practices. In 
broad terms, best-practice risk management frameworks, such as COSO ERM or Project 
Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), build on the promise that organisa-
tions adopting them to manage uncertainties will achieve a reasonable assurance regarding the 
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achievement of their objectives (Power, 2007; Raz & Hillson, 2005).1 In that respect, the lit-
erature has challenged this promise by showing that best-practice risk management frame-
works might limit the ability to manage the full range of uncertainties. Miller, Kurunmäki and 
O’Leary (2008) argue that such frameworks neglect the wider hybrid practices, processes and 
expertise through which much of the management of uncertainty takes place. Power (2009) 
supports this view when he argues that the security provided by such frameworks, at best, is 
limited to certain states of the world and, at worst, is illusory – ‘the risk management of noth-
ing’ (p. 849). 
 
To elaborate more on these findings, Power (2004, 2007) challenges the conception that risk 
management should be about operational risk reduction. He argues that the primary purpose 
of risk management could be to protect the reputation of the organisation against ex post ac-
cusations, what he terms secondary risk management. Power et al. (2009, p. 302) argue that 
‘the adoption of standardized risk management designs has become a benchmark of being a 
legitimate organization’. Jordan, Jørgensen and Mitterhofer (2013) contribute to that debate 
by examining the perceived usefulness of the traffic-light-coloured risk matrix for the every-
day management of risks. They find that the risk matrix comes to act as a “mediating instru-
ment” (Miller & O'Leary, 2007) which has less to do ‘with the increased attention toward 
early warning signals’ (Jordan et al., 2013, p. 156), that is, with operational risk management, 
and more to do with the adjudication of interests and the building of mutual assurance and 
confidence. 
 
In examining how the different purposes of risk management affect risk-related work, the 
literature points to the role of risk management technologies. Jordan, Mitterhofer and Jørgen-
                                                 
1 This paper takes a similar approach to risk and uncertainty as prior accounting studies (Arena et al., 2010; 
Boholm & Corvellec, 2016; Miller et al., 2008) by defining uncertainties as the things we know we do not know 
and risks as those uncertainties that have been made the object of calculative practices (Callon et al., 2009). 
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sen (2016) argue that the risk matrix shapes risk work because of its semantic connotations 
and visual appeal, ‘by means of which complex and potentially not well understood processes 
come to appear simple, imaginable and “manageable”’ (p. 1). Hall and Fernando (2016) show 
that the layout and structure of visual templates for risk assessment can change the focus of 
risk management to solely complying with codified procedures. Kalthoff (2005, 2011) shows 
that companies are constituted anew through devices of risk calculation. These findings add to 
the broader debate on the visual power of technologies for framing the visual performable 
space of practice (Busco & Quattrone, 2015; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2009; Quattrone, 2009). 
It has further been shown that such visualisations generates creative tensions that prompts for 
a continuous search for perfection (Busco & Quattrone, 2017). Pollock and D’Adderio (2012) 
even show how two-by-two matrices are used selectively to produce a ‘beautiful picture’. 
 
Scholars have also examined the work of risk experts in shaping the trajectories of risk man-
agement practices. Arena et al. (2010) show that experts promote certain risk rationalities, but 
also that these rationalities clash with pre-existing management rationales. Mikes (2009) finds 
that management predilections toward risk assessment are contingent on what she terms cal-
culative cultures. Some organisations dedicate themselves to measurement and modelling and 
thereby exhibit a culture of quantitative scepticism, while others rely on experience, intuition 
and judgment and thus exhibit a culture of quantitative scepticism. Mikes (2011) further elab-
orates on the causes of these cultural trajectories and points to the rhetorical work of experts 
for segregating the work practices of risk management from other competing and/or comple-
mentary fields of expertise. She highlights, among other, the reflexive work of ‘facilitating the 
creation and internalization of a specific type of [legitimate] risk talk’ (2016, p. 272). 
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In summary, the current literature has shown that organisations have come to rely on best-
practice risk management frameworks, which, through technologies and the work of experts, 
come to affect the work practices of constructing and managing risks. It remains largely un-
known, however, how organisations translate specific uncertainties into risks and how frame-
works and technologies affect – and might be affected by – such construction processes over 
time. It also remains largely unknown how mutual purposes of risk management develop and 
interrelate over time, particularly how such multiple purposes relate to the visual power of 
technologies and the work of risk experts. Scholars have therefore also called for further re-
search into ‘risk matrices and related risk representation technologies’ (Jordan et al., 2016, p. 
20) and the relationship between technologies and the everyday ‘risk-work’ (Power, 2016a). 
 
3. Callon’s performativity thesis and the concepts of purification and inscriptions 
To make sense of the dynamics of risk management, we rely on Michel Callon’s performa-
tivity thesis (Callon, 1998c, 2007; Callon et al., 2009) and Bruno Latour’s conceptual work on 
purification and inscriptions (Latour, 1986, 1987, 1993). Callon’s performativity thesis posits 
as a starting point that economics (or a statement in general) ‘performs, shapes and formats 
the economy, rather than observing how it functions’ (Callon, 1998b, p. 2). In contrast to ear-
lier perspectives on performativity, which stress the linguistics of performative utterances 
(Austin, 1962) and their socio-cultural contexts (Bourdieu, 1998; Butler, 2010), Callon stress-
es the importance of material assemblages (Callon, 2005, 2007). MacKenzie (2006), for ex-
ample, demonstrated that when financial traders came to perform market prices, besides es-
tablishing certain beliefs and relations, this performation was caused by the ‘incorporation [of 
theories] into algorithms, procedures, routines, and material devices’ (p. 19). 
 
8 
 
To elaborate on the performativity thesis, Callon proposes the intertwined concepts of fram-
ing and overflowing (Callon, 1998a). To define framing, Callon relies on Goffman’s (1974) 
concept of frameworks: ‘The frame establishes a boundary within which interactions… take 
place more or less independently of their surrounding context’ (Callon, 1998a, p. 249). Cal-
lon, again referring to Goffman, further stresses the dual nature of the framing process. On the 
one hand, the frame ‘presupposes actors who are bringing to bear cognitive resources as well 
as forms of behaviour and strategies which have been shaped and structured by previous ex-
perience’ (1998a, p. 249). On the other hand, interactions do not only depend on the commit-
ment of the actors themselves, but are also rooted in the outside world in various physical and 
organisational devices which are themselves contained ‘within an institutional framework… 
which helps to ensure their preservation and reproduction’ (1998a, p. 249). In relation to per-
formativity, framing thus directs attention to the ways in which human as well as non-human 
actors are adjusted and readjusted – or what Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) describe as the 
linguistic, organisational and technological conditions created to make theories ‘come true’. 
 
Callon (1998a) introduces the concept of overflowing to define connections which transgress 
the boundaries of the frame and affect actors ‘who [either] benefit or suffer’ from them (p. 
256). In MacKenzie’s (2006) terms, overflowing corresponds to the concept of counter-
performativity: ‘the use of a theory or model making economic processes less like their depic-
tion by economics’ (p. 56). In contrast to economists, who define overflowing as accidents – 
the unfortunate by-product of economic activities – Callon (1998a) considers overflowing 
‘the rule’ and thereby framing the ‘fragile, artificial result based upon substantial investments’ 
(p. 252). Callon (1998a) further argues that overflows are caused by the very same elements 
which make up the framing process and that ‘without this incompleteness, [the frame] would 
in fact be wholly ineffectual’ (p. 252). Overflowing represents openings onto wider networks 
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to which they give access, which to some degree destabilises the framing process but without 
which ‘it would not be feasible to add value locally’ (p. 255). Overflowing thus directs atten-
tion to the often-unexpected dynamics of making theories ‘come true’. 
 
Technologies, which are among the elements that make up the framing-overflowing process, 
are active mediators that can ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the el-
ements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2005, p. 39). This means that technologies de-
signed to realise a statement can cause ‘other worlds to proliferate in reaction to that perfor-
mation’ (Callon, 2007, p. 323). They possess no inherent properties but are ‘caught in a pro-
cess of coevolution’ (Callon, 2007, p. 329): they are ‘not the source of an action but the mov-
ing target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it’ (Latour, 2005, p. 46). In so far as 
they also produce visual representations of locale entities, like figures, matrices, diagrams and 
maps; they are further inscription devices (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Such devices are partic-
ularly powerful because they enable the mobilisation of an even larger number of potential 
new allies and because they perform the cognition of human actors (Latour, 1986, 1987). 
 
The concept of purification refers to the active processes of turning statements or ideas that 
were once controversial or devalued into acceptable and unchallenged constructions or facts 
(Latour, 1993) and thus relates to the performativity thesis. This concept has the benefit of 
emphasising the active translation work of experts to ‘provide faith to accounting systems and 
to settle controversies with sceptical and resisting groups’ (Christensen & Skærbæk, 2010, p. 
524). Power (2003) has emphasised that purification might only suppress controversies – that 
experts might not actually settle them – which resembles what Callon (1998a, p. 262) terms 
hot situations, where even experts ‘can do nothing’ and are ‘forced to deal with non-
specialists’. In contrast, Callon (1998a) introduces the concept of cold situations to describe 
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situations in which experts can be called on, and agreement regarding ongoing overflows can 
be swiftly achieved. In both hot and cold situations, however, a flow of adjustments is neces-
sary to continuously reframe overflows and ensure the performativity of the theory/statement. 
 
In this article, we draw on the performativity thesis to examine how a best-practice risk man-
agement framework becomes part of the practice it facilitates – or more specifically how 
technologies, humans and other elements are configured and reconfigured over time to actual-
ise the predictions of the framework. The concepts of framing and overflowing highlight the 
complex, long-term dynamics and unexpected effects of translating uncertainties into risks, 
while the concepts of purification and inscription enable us to examine the work of experts 
and the visual power of technologies more specifically. In summary, we are guided by the 
following question: How are uncertainties translated into risks, and what is the role and effect 
of risk management frameworks and technologies, particularly over long periods of time? 
 
4. Method 
This article continues along the path of ‘telling interesting stories’ (Law, 2009, p. 142) by 
drawing on an empirical case study (Latour, 2005). The case study method allows us to trace 
the relations and dynamics between the human and non-human actors involved in the con-
struction of risks. In the words of Latour (1996), this method allows us to describe the ‘gener-
ative path of any narration’ (p. 374) and thus to track the associating work of actors ‘to catch 
up with their often wild innovations’ (Latour, 2005, p. 12). As mentioned earlier, we examine 
the Danish 3.2-billion-euro mega-project called the Signalling Programme. We have followed 
the Signalling Programme for approximately 12 years, from 2005, when the project started, to 
2017, when a seven-year-minimum delay was announced. 
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We use a collection of documents, observation studies and semi-structured interviews as our 
main empirical sources. The documents comprise more than 160 written documents totalling 
more than 1,000 pages, of which the oldest documents date back to the late 1990s, when dis-
cussion of risk management emerged within the Danish public sector. The documents include 
investment and decision reports, project and risk status reports, consultancy reports, invest-
ment proposals, government white papers, meeting agendas, lists of risks and more. The first 
author also had full access to the IT-based system, which was where risk information was 
kept; collected conference presentation materials; and maintained email correspondences with 
key actors of the practice. In sum, this empirical source enabled us to reconstruct the actions 
and events that make up the project and to understand the forms of uncertainties that was con-
structed and approved as risks and included into formal risk status reports. 
 
To more fully understand what takes place during the process of translating uncertainties into 
risks, we also rely on observation studies. The first author carried out 41 observation studies 
for approximately four years from mid-2010 to mid-2014. The observations allowed us to 
follow the actors ‘in action’ (Latour, 2005, p. 128) while the participants were constructing 
the actual risks and to witness the controversies that arose during this process. The observa-
tion studies were carried out at various types of risk meetings and workshops, which were 
where the majority of the risks were identified and assessed. Table 1 lists the observation 
studies. More than 70 different human actors were observed – including risk consultants, pro-
ject managers, the programme director, suppliers and more – constructing approximately 530 
risks. Observations of everyday work practices among project and operational managers were 
also undertaken, but we discontinued these observations, as the managers spent little time on 
risk-related work tasks relative to other tasks. The observation studies were organised as non-
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participant studies. More than 300 pages of extensive field notes were taken during the four-
year period. 
 
Table 1: Observation Studies 
# Type* Year # Type Year 
O-1 Risk Meeting 2010 O-22 Risk Forum 2013 
O-2 Risk Meeting 2010 O-23 Risk Sharing Meeting 2013 
O-3 Risk Meeting 2010 O-24 Risk Forum 2013 
O-4 Risk Meeting 2010 O-25 Risk Approval Meeting 2013 
O-5 Risk Meeting 2010 O-26 Risk Approval Meeting 2013 
O-6 Risk Meeting 2011 O-27 Risk Status Meeting 2013 
O-7 Risk Meeting 2011 O-28 Risk Meeting 2013 
O-8 Cross Risk Review 
Meeting 
2011 O-29 Risk Status Meeting 2014 
O-9 Risk Meeting 2011 O-30 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-10 Risk Meeting 2011 O-31 Risk Status Meeting 2014 
O-11 Risk Meeting 2011 O-32 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-12 Risk Meeting 2011 O-33 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-13 Risk Meeting 2012 O-34 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-14 Risk Meeting 2012 O-35 Risk Forum 2014 
O-15 Risk Workshop 2012 O-36 Risk Forum 2014 
O-16 Risk Meeting 2012 O-37 Cross Risk Review 
Meeting 
2014 
O-17 Risk Meeting 2012 O-38 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-18 Risk Workshop 2012 O-39 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-19 Risk Meeting 2013 O-40 Risk Meeting 2014 
O-20 Risk Forum 2013 O-41 Risk Forum 2014 
O-21 Risk Meeting 2013    
* Risk Forums are status meetings held among the risk consultants of the practice. 
 
Our final data collection technique was to conduct 24 interviews with actors like risk consult-
ants, the programme director, civil servants and project managers. The purpose of the inter-
views was to get an understanding of the actions and events of the project and the work prac-
tice of managing risks from different perspectives. In specific cases, the purpose was also to 
get feedback from the observed meetings concerning controversies, debates and the like. The 
interviews were semi-structured, which allowed the interviewees to provide their own ac-
counts of whatever they found relevant while (mostly) staying within the subject of risk man-
agement. As the interviews had no predefined length, the interviewees had time to communi-
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cate their own understanding of risk management, as well as to follow their own ideas and 
express their own frustrations for as long as they wanted. Each interview typically lasted be-
tween one and two hours and was recorded and transcribed. The interviewees were also given 
the opportunity to receive the transcript afterwards, to allow them to validate the content and 
which enabled us to formulate follow-up questions. Table 2 comprises a list of the interview 
participants. 
 
Table 2: Interview participants* 
# Title Affiliation Year 
I-1 Risk Manager Signalling Programme 2010 
I-2 Senior Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2010 
I-3 Head Project Manager Signalling Programme 2010 
I-4 Programme Director Signalling Programme 2010 
I-5 Civil Servant Ministry of Transport 2010 
I-6 Head Project Manager Signalling Programme 2010 
I-7 Senior Project Consultant Consultancy Company Y 2011 
I-8 Head of Finance Signalling Programme 2011 
I-9 Project Manager Signalling Programme 2011 
I-10 Budget Consultant Consultancy Company Z 2012 
I-11 Head of Safety Rail Net Denmark 2012 
I-12 Senior Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2012 
I-13 Civil Servant Ministry of Transport 2012 
I-14 Civil Servant Ministry of Transport 2012 
I-15 Risk Manager Train Operating Company 2013 
I-16 Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2014 
I-17 Project Manager Rail Net Denmark 2014 
I-18 Head of Secretariat Signalling Programme 2014 
I-19 Governance Manager Consultancy Company Q 2014 
I-20 Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2016 
I-21 Senior Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2016 
I-22 Risk Consultant Consultancy Company X 2016 
I-23 Consultant, Owner 
(Former Programme Director) 
Consultancy Company W 2017 
I-24 Program Risk Manager Rail Net Denmark 2017 
* The titles and affiliations reflect those held at the time we conducted the interviews. 
 
In summary, the three techniques allowed us to trace the human and non-human actors that 
circulated the practice of risk management and to cross-validate our findings (Latour, 2005, p. 
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129). These actors were neither preselected nor predefined when we began the examination, 
but included based on our network tracing only the actors who (or that) did something: the 
mediators. This tracing included both human actors, such as the project managers, and non-
human actors, such as the IT-based system. This choice made it possible for us as observers to 
remain faithful to Callon’s (1986) three methodological principles: agnosticism (that we as 
analysts should remain impartial), generalised symmetry (that we explain conflicting view-
points in the same terms) and free associations (that we allow actors equal opportunities to 
express their own conclusions) (Callon, 1986, pp. 200-201). In accordance with these princi-
ples, we listened to the actors first and sought not to privilege any viewpoints; then, together 
with the other sources, we reconstructed the actions and events as they unfolded. 
 
5. The performativity of risk management 
This section presents our case material. It begins with an examination of the broader network 
of relations that brought the Signalling Programme into existence and the major actions and 
events that make up the risk management practice. It then continues by telling the story of the 
dynamics associated with making the translation of uncertainties of risks more like the predic-
tions of the implemented framework and technologies. It ends with a short epilogue. 
 
5.1. The Signalling Programme and its risk management practice 
In February 2009, the Signalling Programme came into being when the Danish Parliament 
decided to grant 3.2 billion euros to Rail Net Denmark (the state-owned organisation that 
manages the railways infrastructure) to replace all existing signalling systems (Transportmin-
isteriet, 2009). Rail Net Denmark had recommended the total replacement of all signalling 
systems by 2020–21 with two new dedicated, state-of-the-art ones. It was a ‘rock solid busi-
ness case if you want train operations’, as the programme director explained (#I-4), with ‘sub-
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stantial economical and operational benefits’ (Banedanmark, 2009, p. 10). The Signalling 
Programme was established, with its own separate project organisation managed by a pro-
gramme director. It was further divided into seven subprojects and a series of support func-
tions, including risk management. It employs 120 persons on average, about one-third of 
whom are full-time employees and two-thirds of whom are consultants (Banedanmark, 
2008a). The Danish Ministry of Transport (MoT) monitors the project and reports progress to 
the Parliament’s Transport Committee. 
 
The Signalling Programme was the first large Danish public construction project subjected to 
a formal requirement of risk management (Transportministeriet, 2006, 2008). In 2006, the 
Danish Ministry of Finance (MoF) found that large Danish public-sector construction projects 
ended up with cost overruns of 29 per cent, on average, due to inadequate budget and control 
practices (Finansministeriet, 2006). The MoF consequently decided to reform these practices, 
starting with large projects within the jurisdiction of the MoT. This modernisation programme 
came to be known as the New Budgeting Method and introduced, among other elements, the 
requirement that organisations carrying out large projects had to implement risk management 
arrangements to ensure that project objectives would be met (Transportministeriet, 2006, 
2008). The MoF also mobilised Professor Bent Flyvbjerg’s work on reference class forecast-
ing, which the British government had implemented a few years before (Finansministeriet, 
2006). The Danish Parliament endorsed the New Budgeting Method on October 24, 2006, 
which was two days before it approved the Signalling Programme for more detailed project 
planning. 
 
Rail Net Denmark operationalised risk management (Banedanmark, 2008a) in the period be-
tween October 2006 and December 2008. The National Audit Office (NAOD) had only a few 
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years earlier criticised Rail Net Denmark’s management accounting and risk management 
practices (Rigsrevisionen, 2002, 2004, 2005). Rail Net Denmark therefore contracted Rambøll 
A/S, which was part of a larger consultancy conglomerate on the project, to assist them 
(Banedanmark, 2008a). In guiding this operationalisation, Rambøll and Rail Net Denmark 
relied on the PMBOK framework. The PMBOK stresses the traditional best-practice generic 
processes of risk management, which included a series of tools and techniques to support 
these processes (see PMI, 2004, Chapter 11). Consistent with PMBOK, Rambøll also devel-
oped a risk management plan and an IT-based risk management control system (Banedan-
mark, 2008b). In February 2009, with the approval of the project’s proposal, the Danish Par-
liament also approved the operationalisation of risk management (Transportministeriet, 2009). 
Later that year, Rambøll organised the first risk workshops and meetings with project-related 
actors. 
 
In the years between 2010 and 2015, Rambøll established regular risk meetings with the pro-
ject and operational managers and the supplier managers and produced bi-annual risk reports 
for the MoT which showed risk management progress. In the beginning, the majority of these 
project-related actors were positive about risk management, but slowly concerns emerged as 
they started to realise that some of their propositions of risks were excluded. In the spring of 
2012, this development culminated as the average expected cost overrun (defined as the val-
ue-at-risk), which risk management was supposed to decrease, exploded by approximately 50 
per cent. The consultants adjusted the IT-based system by introducing new risk vocabularies 
and a new graphic user interface. They also allocated three more full-time risk consultants, 
adjusted the roles and responsibilities of project-related actors and developed a risk construc-
tion guideline. In the following months, the consultants managed to reduce the value-at-risk, 
but new and different concerns had emerged among the project-related actors. The MoT also 
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intensified their monitoring efforts by requiring risk reports on a quarterly rather than a bi-
annual basis. 
 
In October 2015, Rail Net Denmark announced that the Signalling Programme had missed a 
milestone related to the testing of the new signalling systems and was running a year to a 
year-and-a-half years behind schedule. Soon thereafter, the CEO, CFO and programme direc-
tor resigned (Banedanmark, 2015). In October 2016, the new management announced that the 
entire Signalling Programme would be delayed for two years and that extra costs of 500 mil-
lion euros were expected (Banedanmark, 2016). The risk consultants started working on more 
and new adjustments to the IT-based system, but the frustrations with risk management had 
grown and project and operational managers showed little commitment to risk work. Some of 
the risk consultants even started to question the ability of risk management to prevent disas-
ters. In the beginning of 2017, the entire content of the IT-based system was scrapped, the 
consultants resigned and Rail Net Denmark employed their own manager to re-establish the 
practice. Figure 1 summarises this subsection and shows the major actions and events of the 
practice. 
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5.2. The predictions of PMBOK: framing the construction of risks 
 
When we decided how we wanted to construct the practice, we agreed that we 
would follow PMBOK to define our risk terminologies. We just didn’t want peo-
ple to question our understanding of risk management. (Senior Risk Consultant, 
#I-2) 
 
To understand what happened between October 2006 and December 2008, Rail Net Denmark 
and Rambøll managed to frame the practice of risk management. As the risk consultant states, 
the PMBOK was mobilised so they could avoid all sorts of discussions concerning the ‘right’ 
framing of the practice. The PMBOK predicts that project organisations will improve their 
‘chances of success over a wide range of different projects’ by adopting this framework (PMI, 
2004, p. 3). The PMBOK was thus broadly consistent with the MoF’s and MoT’s New Budg-
eting Method, to which Rail Net Denmark and Rambøll also referred on numerous occasions 
(Banedanmark, 2008a; Rambøll, 2007). The PMBOK had further served as the basis for certi-
fying more than 100,000 professionals (PMI, 2007), which means that the PMBOK represent-
ed an even broader network of experts and brought its own purification to risk management. 
October 2006–
December 2008 
Rail Net Denmark and 
Rambøll operationalize 
risk management based 
on PMBOK; risk man-
agement plan and IT 
based risk management 
control system devel-
oped for the project. 
Fall 2009 
Rambøll starts to exe-
cute risk management; 
broad acceptance from 
managers, but also 
some concern; adjust-
ments made to the IT 
based control system. 
Spring 2012 
Risk management 
practice destabilises; 
value-at-risk increases 
by 50 per cent; concerns 
from risk consultant and 
programme manage-
ment; broad frustration 
from project and opera-
tional managers. 
Late 2012–October 
2015 
Risk management 
practice stabilised; 
value-at-risk reduced; 
controversies reduced, 
new concerns emerge; 
Ministry of Transport 
increases monitoring 
efforts. 
February 2009  
Danish Parliament 
approves Signalling 
Programme including 
risk management. 
Mid 2012–late 2012 
The IT-based risk 
management control 
system is redesigned 
with new risk vocabu-
laries and new user 
interface; a series of 
further adjustments are 
also taken. 
October 2015–2017 
Signalling Programme 
delayed with increased 
costs; CEO, CFO, and 
programme director resign; 
risk management loses its 
significance for many 
project and operational 
managers. 
2010–2012 
Risk management 
carried out systemati-
cally; broad agreement 
exists as to its effec-
tiveness, but concerns 
slowly grow and frus-
trations are more com-
mon. 
Figure 1: The Signalling Programme’s risk management: major actions and events  
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The PMBOK came to affect the risk consultants’ definition of the language for the practice 
and conditioned how other actors were to think and talk about risks. The consultants defined 
risks as an ‘uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a 
project’s [risk] objectives’ (Rambøll, 2007, p. 26). They further defined these project risk ob-
jectives as project costs, project time, train punctuality, benefits and Rail Net Denmark’s 
reputation towards the MoT.2 Finally, they defined risk management as ‘to increase the prob-
ability and impact of positive events and decrease the probability and impact of events ad-
verse to the project’ (Rambøll, 2007, p. 1). In this sense, consistent with the PMBOK, the 
consultants framed the boundaries of the forms of uncertainties that the actors were to think 
and talk about as risks, namely as probabilistically measurable events with effects on project 
objectives. The consultants therefore also excluded other forms of uncertainties like those 
associated with the long-term effects of the project, which included, for example, train service 
safety and systems maintenance, or those uncertainties with effects on other entities than the 
project itself. 
 
The risk consultants also relied on PMBOK to define the organisational arrangements of the 
practice, including the roles and responsibilities of project actors. The consultants defined 
project managers and their teams of operational managers as ‘risk owners’ (specialists); and 
themselves – or anyone appointed as such – as ‘risk experts’. The risk owners were described 
as responsible for the identification, assessment, response planning and management of risks, 
while the risk experts were described as responsible for the organisation and facilitation of 
risk workshops and meetings, the analysis of risks, the monitoring and reporting on the status 
                                                 
2 While PMBOK prescribes the ‘classic textbook’ usage of cost, time, and quality as objectives, which corre-
sponds to Rail Net Denmark’s usage of cost, time, and punctuality; Rail Net Denmark and Rambøll added ‘bene-
fits’ (potential positive effects on later operations) and ‘Rail Net Denmark’s reputation towards the MoT’ on 
their own. As this article goes on to show, however, Rail Net Denmark and Rambøll ended up dropping the latter 
two objectives. They also excluded safety because another support function handles such matters elsewhere. 
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of the practice and the further development of the practice. The risk consultants also defined 
which of the PMBOK’s tools and techniques that had to be applied. The consultants mobi-
lised the cause-and-effect structure for risk description and documentation, the known proba-
bility and impact matrix (the risk matrix) for risk assessment and Monte Carlo simulations for 
value-at-risk calculations. The risk consultants then ultimately wrote down their definitions 
into a document called the risk management plan, which they circulated to the programme’s 
management. 
 
The consultants lastly defined the technological arrangements of the practice by developing a 
comprehensive risk management control system based on Microsoft Access. The purpose of 
the IT-based system was to register all risk-related information, allocate risk owners to risks, 
generate lists of risks, calculate the value-at-risk and generate progress charts (value-at-risk 
bar charts) usable for reporting risk status. In examining the structure of the IT-based system, 
the system came to reflect the PMBOK’s definitions, tools and techniques. In other words, the 
IT-based system translated the words and templates of documents into a hands-on ready-to-
use physical and visible technology. It was a computer programming translation of the words 
of the PMBOK into codes, categories, menus, boxes and fields that could be used on risk 
workshops and meetings to visualise the framing and guide the distributed cognitions and 
interactions of the participants. Figure 2 shows the main visual interface of the system. The 
textboxes show how the fields, boxes and menu options relate to the process of constructing 
risks. 
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In February 2009, the Danish Parliament approved the Signalling Programme and granted 
Rail Net Denmark the 3.2 billion euros required to execute the project without any questions 
asked about the framing of risk management. To understand this apparent straightforward 
decision, the purifying work of experts in defining the linguistic, organisational and techno-
logical infrastructure needs to be stressed. This framing built on PMBOK which – through its 
status as a firmly established professional tool – brought its own purification to the process. 
This was also consistent with the MoF’s risk management modernisation programme which 
provided the broader institutional framework needed for the risk consultants’ ‘laboratory 
work’. Thus, within the first two years of the project, the consultants developed and imple-
Figure 2: Main visual interface of the IT-based system year 2007 
 
Risk Identification 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
Risk Response Planning 
 
Risk Monitoring 
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mented the arrangements necessary to actualise the predictions of the risk management pro-
gramme. 
 
5.3. The actualisation of PMBOK: The translation of uncertainties into pure risks 
In the years between 2009 and spring 2012, which corresponds to the period between the po-
litical approval of the project and the signing of the contracts, Rambøll’s risk experts actual-
ised the predictions of PMBOK and made the ‘world’ of risk construction more like its dic-
tates. The actualisation took place in the various risk meetings and workshops organised by 
the risk consultant (cf. #I-1, #I-2 and #I-4). In this period, 250 propositions or reassessments 
of risks were observed, which all ended up matching the criteria the consultants had estab-
lished (#O-1 to #O-16). These 250 propositions and reassessments were all described using 
the cause-and-effect structure; colour-graded on the risk matrix; given risk ownership; catego-
rised according to type, variant, subproject and project phase; and had risk reducing actions 
listed. As the above information had to be recorded by the IT-based system – and only that 
information – all uncertainties that ended up accepted as risks were therefore only those that 
had been constructed to match the fields and boxes of the system, or what we term the pure 
risks of the practice. 
 
The following interaction among a risk consultant, an assisting manager, a head project man-
ager of one of the seven subprojects and a senior railway operations and management consult-
ant illustrates the translation of uncertainties into pure risks. The interaction is representative 
of the 250 propositions and reassessments. It took place at the beginning of a regular risk 
meeting for one of the subprojects and lasted several minutes. We have broken it down into 
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two passages, one dealing with the description of the risk, the other with the assessment of the 
risk.3 
 
‘I have a new risk I would like to include’, the senior railway operations and man-
agement consultant says. He explains that the train operating companies (TOCs) 
are responsible for developing the operational guidelines for their train drivers, 
but that they are not going to be ready on time. ‘So, this is just stakeholder man-
agement’, the assisting manager states, while the risk consultant types into the IT-
based system’s risk description field what the project’s consultant says, which is 
visible on a projector canvas. ‘It’s much more complex than that’, the head project 
manager says. He explains that the problem relates to the segregation of duties be-
tween different public agencies. He argues that this can lead to a complete traffic 
breakdown. The risk consultant, who has been typing something into the risk 
cause field, now asks the participants to comment on the following text: ‘TOCs 
are responsible for issuing and getting approval for the operational rules for their 
staff (drivers, shunters, etc.)’. The head project manager and the project’s consult-
ant broadly agree with this, but the project’s consultant argues that the sentence 
does not capture the complexity of the discussion. The project’s consultant asks 
the risk consultant to continue the sentence by adding, at a minimum, the follow-
ing clause: ‘…these rules must be ready, however, before early deployment 
scheme’. The risk consultant adds the text. He also writes ‘delays and increased 
costs’ as the text into the risk effect field. There are no comments from the other 
participants. (#O-3) 
 
This interaction illustrates how the head project manager and the senior railway operations 
and management consultant, despite their combined experience and technical knowledge 
about the project, did not end up with their proposed risk description. The interaction shows 
that the risk consultant, equipped with the IT-based system, frames and purifies the descrip-
tion of the risk.4 In the interaction, the actors begin by discussing the nature of the uncertainty 
(TOCs not preparing guidelines on time), its causes (the complexity of public administration), 
and its effects (potentially, a complete breakdown in train traffic). The consultant ends up not 
capturing the subtler dimensions of the discussion, however, but only what fits the system’s 
case-and-effect structure. He simplifies the discussion about stakeholder management and 
                                                 
3 The remaining aspects of the risk response planning, documentation and categorisation were also carried out, 
but because they largely transpired without much debate, we do not mention them. 
4 We cannot rule out the possibility that personal relations and feelings affected certain constructions of risks. 
But because we observed the same outcome across 250 constructions of uncertainties as risks involving more 
than 70 different people, we argue that the findings go beyond personal relations and feelings. 
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reduces the potential effect of a traffic breakdown to ‘delays and increased costs’. The interac-
tion continues: 
 
‘So, let’s move to risk assessment’, the risk consultant says and checks the catego-
ries of ‘cost f-banen’, ‘time f-banen’, ‘cost s-banen’, ‘time s-banen’, and ‘reputa-
tion’.5 The senior railway operations and management consultant replies that the 
probability for ‘time s-banen’ and ‘cost s-banen’ should be set to ‘highly likely’ 
(20 to 65 per cent). He argues that the TOCs’ guidelines need to be finalised by 
the end of the year to avoid delays and additional costs. He continues: ‘For f-
banen, we will have one more year until early deployment’. He argues that the 
probability for ‘time f-banen’ and ‘cost f-banen’ should be set to ‘likely’ (5 to 20 
per cent). He also insists that the risk consultant checks the ‘reputation’ category 
as ‘highly likely’. The two consultants debate the assessments for some minutes, 
but the risk consultant eventually checks the boxes accordingly… The risk con-
sultant: ‘Okay, so what will the consequences be?’. The project’s consultant says 
that consequence for ‘time s-banen’, ‘cost s-banen’ and ‘reputation’ should be set 
to ‘high’ (6–12 months; 20–40 million euros; significant degradation in credibil-
ity) and that consequence for ‘time f-banen’ and ‘cost f-banen’ should be set to 
‘moderate’ (3–6 months; 20–100 million euros). The risk consultant challenges 
these assessments several times. In the end, the project’s consultant and the head 
project manager decide to lower the consequence assessment of ‘reputation’ from 
‘high’ to ‘moderate’. The risk consultant selects the corresponding categories and 
says that the risk is now ‘red’ for the two ‘s-banen’-assessments and ‘yellow’ for 
all others, referring to the risk map with the mouse cursor. The risk consultant 
saves the changes to the system. (#O-3) 
 
This latter part of the interaction shows that the head project manager and the senior railway 
operations and management consultant ended up performing the risk assessment according to 
the layout of the IT-based system. These two actors assessed the risk according to the pre-
existing project objectives, the assessment categories and the probability and impact matrix.6 
The actors did discuss whether the consequences of the risk had to be assessed as high or 
moderate, but they never once discussed the relevance of the categories themselves. The risk 
consultant even selected the assessment categories to be used without getting any reaction 
from the head project manager and the project’s consultant. The risk consultant equipped with 
                                                 
5 F-banen is an acronym for the main and regional lines and s-banen for the Copenhagen mass transit system. 
6 In this example, the actors did not comment on the benefits and punctuality objectives. The exclusion of these 
objectives (and Rail Net Denmark’s reputation toward the MoT) became increasingly frequent during this peri-
od. 
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the IT-based system therefore limited the many ways the assessment could have been con-
ducted. 
 
These two parts of the interaction show how the IT-based system became a mediator, which 
through visualisation facilitated a productive approach to the construction of risks, but also, 
simultaneously, limited this process by framing the participants’ cognitions. In this sense, the 
physical visualisations of the IT-based system, which the participants are confronted with, 
adds to the purifying work of the risk consultants. In subsequent interviews with different 
project managers, the actors explained, further, that they knew they had to match their pro-
posed risks to the categories (#I-3, #I-6 and #I-9). The observation studies also confirm that 
participants in the meetings usually look closely at the projector canvas, follow the movement 
of the mouse cursor, and watch what the risk consultants type (#O-1 to #O-41). Equipped 
with the IT-based system, the risk consultants had therefore managed to shape the construc-
tion of risks. 
 
In a last step to actualise the predictions of PMBOK, the risk consultants reported the progress 
of their work monthly to the Signalling Programme’s management and bi-annually to the 
MoT for monitoring purposes. In making these reports, the risk consultants relied on the IT-
based system’s Monte Carlo simulations to graphically inscribe the development of risk man-
agement into a bar chart showing the programme’s value-at-risk. Figure 3 shows this visual 
inscription for the replacement of the regional lines’ signalling systems. It shows that the val-
ue-at-risk dropped from approximately 1.3 billion euros to 300 million euros (or 1.5 billion to 
350 million euros for the entire Signalling Programme). In ‘reading’ this bar chart, the MoT 
and the programme’s management explained that they were sceptical about the numerical 
values, since all of the assessments relied on project actors’ best judgements (#I-13, #I-14). 
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Interestingly, they still argued that they could take the relative development over time as a 
valid indicator of risk management progress. In summary, during this period, the risk consult-
ants, the programme’s management, and the MoT managed to actualise the predictions of the 
PMBOK. 
 
5.4. The overflowing of risk management: emerging concerns and impure risks 
In the period between 2009 and 2012, the technological arrangements that had made risk 
management valuable had also been conduits for overflows. In the beginning, these overflows 
primarily related to managers expressing concerns about their new role as risk owners (#O-1 
to #O-5; #I-1 to #I-6). Some managers expressed concern that they had to produce reliable 
assessments, particularly concerning the benefits and reputation categories, while others 
found that the practice was impeding other job responsibilities (#I-1; #O-1 to #O-11). Over 
these three years, however, the IT-based system also became subject to concerns as managers 
started to realise that the system prevented some of their proposed risks from being included. 
We observed that the risk consultants excluded approximately 120 propositions or reassess-
ments of risks by visually confronting the actors who proposed them with the layout of the IT-
based system (#O-1 to #O-16).7 These risks can be termed impure risks to denote that they 
were still considered as risks for some actors – and thus not just something uncertain – but 
still excluded for not fitting the IT-based system and thus the framing of the PMBOK frame-
work. 
 
The following interaction illustrates the exclusion of a proposition of a new risk. The interac-
tion took place during a risk meeting after a project manager had suggested that the new sig-
nalling system on the regional lines could bankrupt small train-operating companies: 
                                                 
7 We also observed the exclusion of a small number of risk propositions without disagreement. Consistent with 
our observed actors, we treat such proposed but excluded-by-agreement risks simply as uncertainties. 
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‘What do you mean?’ the risk consultant asks. The project manager explains that 
the new signalling system requires that the operators invest in proper train com-
munication hardware. He continues and explains that the small operators might 
not have the necessary capital to make the investment and thus might not be able 
to operate. ‘They will not survive’, he states. The risk consultant replies that this 
situation relates to the operators’ objectives. ‘It’s out of scope and irrelevant for 
us’, he adds and explains the purpose of the practice by using the mouse cursor to 
show the cause, risk, and effect fields within the IT-based system on the projector 
canvas. The project manager looks frustrated and gazes around the table. The oth-
ers look down and seem to ignore him. The project manager adds that, if the train 
operating companies do not survive, this may turn out to be a problem for the 
people using trains to commute to and from work. He says this might all turn out 
as one big media scandal, which may threaten the programme. The risk consultant 
says he knows nothing about that and ends the discussion. Nobody says anything. 
(#O-2) 
 
This interaction illustrates how the project manager’s proposed risk of small train operators 
not being able to survive was found to be impure, as the proposition did not fit the IT-based 
system’s cause-and-effect structure. The IT-based system had been developed around the 
PMBOK’s project-focused objectives, which meant that a potential risk threatening other enti-
ties’ objectives were ‘out of scope and irrelevant for us’, to use the words of the risk consult-
ant. In a discussion immediately following, the risk consultant explained that this kind of 
‘sorting’ was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the risk construction process. The pro-
ject manager, however, was frustrated with the situation and ended up hurt by the framing. To 
understand this suffering, as a head project manager explained, the project managers had to 
deal with these risks on their own without receiving the necessary resources (#I-9). In addi-
tion to the beneficial effects of the IT-based system for enabling the effective construction of 
risks, the system was therefore also a conduit for overflows that sometimes hurt and frustrated 
managers. 
 
The project managers’ way of dealing with their concerns about the IT-based system was fur-
ther limited as they were not allowed to establish their own risk management practices (#I-9, 
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#I-12). Such practices were only loosely defined and drew on simple technologies, like post-
its or paper sheets, but they included ‘our risks, the subprojects’ risks, those that we find im-
portant’ (#I-9). Whenever the programme’s management learned about such practices, it 
closed them down for undermining the IT-based system (#I-12). In consequence, many im-
pure risks were left unmanaged. When asked about the amount of these, another head project 
manager explained: ‘Yes, I have many of those. Yes!’ (#I-11). 
 
In the spring of 2012, the concerns and frustrations gained new heights as the IT-based system 
started to generate rapidly increasing value-at-risk calculations, which culminated with a 50 
per cent value-at-risk increase. The Signalling Programme’s management had recently signed 
the last of the contracts with the main suppliers, whom the risk consultants had enrolled in the 
practice as risk owners on terms similar to those of the project and operational managers. In 
collaboration with the project and operational managers, these actors started to propose risks, 
which fit the structure of the IT-based system, but which the risk consultants believed were 
‘parts of larger already-included risks’ (#I-12). The consultants unsuccessfully tried to man-
age these proposals by elaborating on existing risks and thus avoiding having to add new risks 
with new assessments that would increase the value-at-risk. A risk consultant explained: 
 
We have a problem, a real problem. Now that we have so many new risks coming 
in, we can now see that the risk value is increasing, which is because we are add-
ing so many new risks. But we have trouble managing; we are having a lot of 
trouble managing; because we don’t think it should be increasing. We believe it 
should be going down… It is something process-like, technical-like going wrong, 
and we do not have a solution for this yet… So far, we have been able to explain 
this development to our CEO, who receives our monthly reports, but we cannot 
report this to the MoT. We need to do something about this. (Senior Risk Consult-
ant, #I-12) 
 
This statement shows that the risk consultant attributes this situation to something ‘process-
like, technical-like’ with the IT-based system and not the prediction of the PMBOK. In fol-
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lowing this prediction, the risk consultant claimed that the value-at-risk had to be decreasing, 
but because the opposite was taking place and because the MoT expected decreasing value-at-
risks, the system had to be malfunctioning and “something had to be done”. By mid-2012, the 
concerns and frustrations with the IT-based system were therefore no longer limited to the 
project and operational managers’ concerns with the inclusion or exclusion of risks. The risk 
consultants and the programme’s management had also become concerned with the IT-based 
system, particularly how the value-at-risk progress would look for the broader network of 
actors. In addition to co-producing the conditions for the actualisation of the PMBOK predic-
tion, that is, framing the construction of the risks and the visualisation of risk management 
progress, the IT-system had been a conduit for overflows which distorted these very same 
predictions. 
 
5.5. The reframing dynamics of stabilising PMBOK’s predictions 
In the years between 2010 and 2012, the risk consultants had already on several occasions 
attempted to manage the emerging concerns among the project and operational managers. The 
consultants had spent many hours teaching the roles and responsibilities of risk owners to the 
managers (#I-1). In agreement with the programme’s management and the MoT, the consult-
ants had also stopped demanding assessments on the two objectives of benefits and reputation 
and was now strictly relying on the three remaining objectives (#I-12, #I-16). The largest – 
and most expensive – reframing effort was the reprogramming and redesign of the IT-based 
system from a Microsoft Access-based platform to an Internet-based platform. Figure 4 shows 
the new main visual interface. It largely resembles the earlier main interface (see textboxes), 
but with two crucial differences: 1) the risk ‘tags’ feature (to which we return shortly as this 
was only added after a second redesign, but see the upper-left and right corners of the figure), 
30 
 
and 2) that managers could now access the system on their own using any computer, tablet or 
phone. 
 
In the beginning of 2012, the redesigned system was launched, which according to the risk 
consultants was a success because the new system could be ‘used more flexibly by the project 
managers’ and thus had reduced the need for risk meetings (#I-12). In the months that fol-
lowed, however, the risk consultants realised that the new reframing efforts had led to new 
overflows in the form of the drastically increasing value-at-risk calculations. In responding to 
this development, the consultancy company and the programme’s management held a crisis 
meeting and quickly decided to allocate three additional risk consultants. These consultants 
were to yet again carry out risk meetings, carry out risk management status meetings and de-
velop a set of risk construction guidelines. Further, the major suppliers were each told to ap-
point a risk spokesperson to coordinate their risk efforts, and the seven subprojects each had 
to appoint a project risk manager to monitor their risk efforts more closely (#I-16; #O-22). 
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While the major reframing efforts helped to ensure that risk propositions were again taking 
place in formal meetings, and consistent with the framing of the practice, the value-at-risk – 
which according to the framing of the practice, should decrease (#I-12) – was still increasing. 
In continuing the reframing of the construction of risks, the consultants equipped themselves 
with elaborate linguistic categories that extended the boundaries of their judgements. The 
consultants divided the concept of risk into ‘overall risks’ (those that affect the overall pro-
ject’s objectives), ‘sub-risks’ (those that only affect the individual subprojects’ objectives), 
‘risks under review’ and ‘approved risks’. The consultants further had programmers revise the 
system for a second time by adding these new concepts into the IT-based system’s visual in-
terface as the before-mentioned tickable tags and by restricting the risk owners from accessing 
them. These tags allowed the risk consultants to include risks during meetings as items visible 
within the system (by tagging ‘overall risks’ and ‘approved’) while at the same time exclud-
Figure 4: Main visual interface of the IT-based system year 2012 
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ing them from Monte Carlo simulations (the technique used to produce the value-at-risk cal-
culations). 
 
In the years between 2013 and 2015, the IT-based system provided the conditions necessary 
for the risk consultants to continue to produce decreasing value-at-risk inscriptions and for 
limiting the concerns of the project managers, the operational managers and now the supplier 
managers. Simultaneously, however, the IT-based system was yet again a cause of overflows, 
this time related to the new way of including or excluding risks using the four tags. The fol-
lowing interaction demonstrates this overflowing. It took place during a risk meeting between 
five people: two risk consultants, an end-to-end manager (a management representative with 
the authority to tag risks), the head of safety and a safety manager. One of the two risk con-
sultants had just opened an earlier proposed risk related to the alignment of operational con-
cepts, system definitions and functional requirements onto the projector canvas and all of the 
participants were looking at the new IT-systems visual interface: 
 
End-to-end manager: ‘This assessment is unrealistic. It’s way too high’. Head of 
safety: ‘Okay, but then please make another assessment – and argue for it’. End-
to-end manager: ‘We’re working on an operational concept here, so I can’t see 
how it can take a year in delays’. Head of safety: ‘This risk needs to be solved by 
X [a group of managers], but, so far, this group is very far from having the com-
petencies to actually do something about this’. The end-to-end manager looks out-
raged: ‘I completely disagree.’ Head of safety: ‘How would you assess it then?’ 
End-to-end manager: ‘Low, one to three months, unlikely, 1 to 5 per cent’. Head 
of safety: ‘That’s ridiculous!’. The first risk consultant: ‘That’s far from the pre-
sent assessment’… The head of safety stresses that he cannot approve a reduction 
that moves it out of the ‘red area’. The end-to-end manager gets angry: ‘I just 
have to check that it will not be included’. The first risk consultant backs him up. 
The head of safety clearly gets angry now. He almost yells, arguing they have to 
approve the risk because they will need executive attention and actions taken right 
now. ‘I will not be responsible for not having flagged what I see as our most ap-
parent risk!’, he says… In the end, they agree to disagree, and the first risk con-
sultant saves the changes by tagging them ‘under review’ (rather than ‘approved’). 
(#O-28) 
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This interaction shows how the risk consultants used the IT-based system’s ‘tag’ of ‘under 
review’ to exclude the proposed risk despite the fact that the two safety-related managers dis-
agreed with the decision. In their opinion, the consultants should have tagged the proposition 
as ‘approved’, but because they failed to convince the end-to-end manager, the proposition 
ultimately ended up tagged as ‘under review’. It was thus evident that, despite the beneficial 
effects of the system for the risk consultants and the end-to-end manager, the system simulta-
neously ended up hurting the two safety-related managers. The interaction also illustrates 
how, with the reframing of the IT-based system, the risk consultants developed a very subtle 
and advanced mechanism for including or excluding risk propositions. These propositions 
were only partly included within the system. That is, they were visible, as if they had been 
accepted, but exactly because they had not been accepted (i.e., tagged as ‘approved’) they 
were found impure. In this period, more and more risk propositions were excluded using this 
tagging mechanism.  
 
In the period after the October 2015 announcement of the one to one-and-a-half year delay 
and the resignation of the CEO, the CFO and the programme director, the overflowing be-
came more pervasive. Together with the last two to three years of risk proposition exclusions, 
the announcement and the resignations led the project managers, operational managers and 
supplier managers to largely stop using the IT-based system (#I-24). Some of the consultants 
themselves even started to question the ability of risk management to prevent disasters (#I-
20), and the MoT were concerned to the degree that they strengthened their monitoring ef-
forts. The consultants continued undeterred to reframe the risk management practice – this 
time by relying on PMBOK to develop a more advanced visualisation technique called the 
tornado diagram – but the overflows prevailed.8 In the beginning of 2017, Rail Net Denmark 
                                                 
8 This paper will not go further into these reframing efforts. The tornado diagram represents a visualisation tech-
nique that allows the value-at-risk calculation to be correlated with the relative importance of the individual 
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ended its collaboration with the risk consultants, employed their own risk management expert 
and ended up scrapping the content of the IT-based system. The PMBOK and the IT-system 
themselves, however, were praised. As the new risk expert said: ‘This time, we just have to do 
it right’ (#I-24). 
 
In summing up the developments that took place during these years, the risk consultants and 
the programme’s management carried out a stream of apparently unending adjustments to re-
actualise the predictions of the PMBOK framework. These adjustments were all mediators 
that were used to stabilise the construction of risks and reframe emerging overflows, but they 
also produced new and quite unexpected overflows which distorted and transformed the very 
meaning they were supposed to carry and prompted even further adjustments to be made. In 
particular, the IT-based system and its changing visualisations proved productive for settling 
overflows, though this was always temporarily and led to new overflows, requiring new ad-
justments. In these procedural framing-overflowing dynamics, the project managers, opera-
tional managers and supplier managers as well as the programme’s management and the con-
sultants all gained a temporarily effectual and at times hurtful approach to risk management. 
 
5.6. Epilogue 
In January 2017, the National Audit Office of Denmark (NAOD) announced the findings of 
an investigation into the delays of the Signalling Programme. The report criticised both Rail 
Net Denmark’s management and the MoT’s supervision of the programme (Rigsrevisionen, 
2017). In particular, the NAOD highlighted that the MoT had known about the problems be-
forehand without informing the Danish Parliament. In November 2017, Deloitte, whom the 
MoT, Rail Net Denmark and the MoF had contracted to review the project, concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(pure) risks and then graphically shown with the most impactful risks at the top of a bar chart (thus forming a 
tornado). The latest edition of PMBOK recommends tornado diagrams for quantitative risk analyses (PMI, 
2013). 
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project was going to be subject to further delays of up to seven years. The Signalling Pro-
gramme moreover had to be downscaled to avoid additional delivery problems. The Deloitte 
report is fascinating in many respects, not least for its conclusion that ‘risk management has 
been too low a priority’ (Deloitte, 2017, p. 5). 
 
6. Discussion 
The following section has been organised into three subsections: 1) the performativity of 
frameworks and technologies and the construction of risks; 2) the visual power of risk man-
agement inscriptions; and 3) the power and effects of consultants as risk experts. 
 
6.1. The performativity of frameworks and technologies and the construction of risks 
This article represents one the few studies to show that theories such as those mobilised by 
frameworks are neither true nor false descriptions of a pre-existing world, but that they bring 
that world into being through the framing and actualisation of a series of arrangements 
(Callon, 2007; Ferraro et al., 2005). Hall and Fernando (2016), Miller et al. (2008) and Power 
(2009) evince that best-practice risk management frameworks might paradoxically fetter the 
abilities of organisations to manage all uncertainties. Our article adds further empirical depth 
to this theoretical insight by showing that the PMBOK framework ended up performing vari-
ous linguistic, organisational and technological arrangements of the practice, which limited 
the ability of the project, operational and supplier managers to construct risks. Following Cal-
lon (1998a), however, without this incompleteness, without framing the boundaries of risk 
construction, the participating actors would not have had an effectual approach to risk man-
agement. This limitation thus had the additional effect of sustaining the processes of con-
structing risks or, put differently, frameworks of risk management can still be useful for risk 
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management purposes, despite their apparent limitations for the ability to manage all forms of 
uncertainties. 
 
In focusing more on these purposes, Power (2004, 2007) and Jordan et al. (2013) stress that 
risk management has less to do with the practicalities of operational risk management and 
more to do with broader organisational processes such as legitimation and confidence build-
ing. Our article contributes to the extant literature by showing that frameworks can enact the 
simultaneous coexistence of multiple purposes or realities of risk management. The project 
managers, the operational managers and the suppliers primarily used risk management for 
operational purposes, to propose risks that were relevant for them to meet the project’s objec-
tives. In contrast, the risk consultants and the programme’s management were more con-
cerned with producing a value-at-risk bar chart that accorded with the predictions of the 
PMBOK. In understanding the broader role of the PMBOK, it enacted two different realities 
of risk management. These realities clashed on several occasions, leading to the series of ad-
justments made by the consultants as they sought to stabilise the PMBOK’s ‘promised’ world 
of greater chances of project success. During this process, the risk consultants and the pro-
gramme’s management were largely able to maintain their ‘reality’. Overflowing continued to 
emerge, nevertheless. 
 
The IT-based control system with its assemblage of technologies was crucial to actualise and 
re-actualise the world of PMBOK. It transcended the role of a mediating instrument (Jordan et 
al., 2013) or a risk representation device (Kalthoff, 2005) that enabled the construction of 
risks. It was an active mediator (Latour, 2005) that also distorted this process and led to unex-
pected effects, most prominently, the exclusion of certain risk propositions which for the pro-
ject-related actors were material uncertainties. Interestingly, the IT-based system became the 
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target of the frustrations with the construction of risks; this meant that the PMBOK remained 
free of criticism. Our article contributes to the broader range of performativity studies (e.g., 
Callon, 2007; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2005; MacKenzie, 2006; Tryggestad, 
2005). It shows that technologies serve as buffers to shield (economic) theories or frameworks 
against competing views, thus strengthening the enactment of that theory’s particular world. 
This is a key insight from our paper: how technologies preserve failing models. 
 
Our finding that technologies, like the IT-based system, are part of the process of performa-
tivity serves to problematise their usefulness for auditing purposes (Jordan et al., 2013; 
Power, 2013; Power, 2016a). The IT-based system enabled the defensive production of audit 
trails by allowing the ‘riskwork to be checked’ (Power, 2016a, p. 280). The system, for exam-
ple, would be used to generate status reports to the MoT, which allowed the project to ‘pass 
[short term] decision gates’ (Jordan et al., 2013, p. 168). In the periods between these reports, 
however, the IT-based system underwent adjustments that changed the conditions of the re-
cording of risks, like the four tagging categories, which provided a subtle mechanism to in-
clude or exclude risk propositions. Such changes make technologies like an IT-based system 
(or any risk register) problematic, even potentially useless, for later project audits and ex-post 
inquiries. The amount of judgment that goes into assessing uncertainties – which includes 
uncertainties that cannot be made calculative with any statistical reliability (Keynes, 1937; 
Knight, 1921) – contribute further to this problem. When decision makers, like the MoT, the 
MoF or politicians, rely on theories like the PMBOK, which reflect mainstream economics 
that considers overflows and reframing as exceptions, the corollary might be the creation of a 
false sense of security for the project objectives. 
 
6.2. The visual power of risk management inscriptions and their devices 
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Scholars have recently begun to examine the visual nature of accounting technologies and 
inscriptions (e.g., Busco & Quattrone, 2015, 2017; Jordan et al., 2016; Justesen & Mouritsen, 
2009; Quattrone, 2009, 2015). Their central argument is that the power of technologies owes 
less to the conveyance of knowledge content and more to the visual nature of the inscriptions 
they produce. Notable examples include two-by-two matrices (Pollock & D'Adderio, 2012) 
and strategy maps (Qu & Cooper, 2011). These technologies become ‘narrative systems of 
visual representations’ that both stimulate and organise the work around them. As Busco and 
Quattrone (2015, 2017) remind us, visualisations that are always in-tension and performative. 
In our article, the IT-based system visually framed the performable space of the practice. This 
system confronted the participants visually with the boundaries of the practice by showing 
them the fields, categories and maps, which comprised the risk construction criteria. It was a 
technology for both inventory, the classification of knowledge in spaces, and invention, the 
generation of new knowledge. It was a ‘maieutic machine’ (Busco & Quattrone, 2017) par 
excellence. 
 
Building on the studies described above, this article shows that technologies’ visual inscrip-
tions not only stimulate and organise the work around them, but also themselves undergo 
change through the process of engagement. The IT-based system was more than an assem-
blage of visual representations that enabled the users to build their own plots (Busco & 
Quattrone, 2015; Czarniawska, 1998). It also had its own distributed plot as a state-of-the-art 
PMBOK-risk management control system – and was even part of the larger government mod-
ernisation programme. We see the importance of visualisation when the PMBOK’s definition 
of perfection came under threat – for example, when the value-at-risk rose, which would have 
disproved its predictions and opened the door to political turmoil. The visualisations were 
reframed to promote a cognition – “the search for perfection” – consistent with the PMBOK’s 
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predictions. This provided a way to maintain a ‘beautiful picture’ (Pollock & D'Adderio, 
2012), apparently unproblematically, when in fact, the system, following Busco and Quat-
trone’s (2017) evocative word play, was both ‘intension’ and ‘in-tension’. In turn, this led to 
new overflows and a seemingly ‘unending reframing to perfect risk management’ (Vinnari & 
Skærbæk, 2014, p. 516). 
 
Our article extends the insights of Jordan et al. (2016) by showing that the power of risk ma-
trices/maps extends beyond their interdiscursive appeal. Our argument is that the visual and 
physical presence of the matrices and maps played a critical role in the risk meetings and 
workshops. Our findings show that the risk matrix’s six categories of interdiscursive appeal 
(iconicity, semantic motivation, metaphoric extensions, ambiguity, isotopic relations and iso-
morphic relations) came to perform the construction of risks. When overflowing began to 
emerge, however, the consultants could not rely on discourse or talk alone – that is, the devel-
opment of new risk vocabularies. The consultants had to visually change the interface of the 
IT-based system and physically apply the new interface to the meetings and workshops before 
they could provisionally settle the controversies. During these meetings, the consultants 
would physically point to the visual interface of the system whenever controversies emerged. 
Building on the findings of Kalthoff (2011), who primarily attributes strategies of ‘undoing 
calculations’ to discursive manoeuvres, we demonstrate that such discourse has to be in-
scribed in technologies, or materialities more generally, to undo calculations. 
 
6.3. The power and effects of consultants as risk experts 
The visual power of the IT-based system was closely related to the work of the risk consult-
ants as the risk experts of risk management. It is well established that risk management comes 
to be formed by risk experts through their boundary-defining work (Mikes, 2009, 2011), as 
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well as through the rivalry between different groups of experts, such as accountants and spe-
cialists (Arena et al., 2010). This article extends these findings by showing how consultants, 
as risk experts, purified the construction of risks over time by mobilising a series of media-
tors, which led to the production of pure and impure risks. Building on the work of Arena et 
al. (2010), who point to the ability of experts ‘to carve out a space for risk management’, we 
argue that the broader network of actors brought into existence by the MoF and the MoT 
‘carved out that space’ for them. In combination with the reliance on the PMBOK, which 
brought its own purification to risk management, and the audit reports from the NAOD, which 
problematised the accounting practices, the MoF and the MoT provided the consultants with 
the broader institutional framework needed to ensure their framing and preserve their techno-
logical inventions. 
 
The risk experts furthermore performed both quantitative enthusiasm and quantitative scepti-
cism (Mikes, 2009, 2011) or what can be termed, paraphrasing Callon and Law (2005), a 
‘qualculative’ approach to risk management. The risk experts required that the risk owners 
quantified their risk assessments according to the five (later three) project risk objectives and 
that Monte Carlo simulation was applied to calculate the value-at-risk. These assessments, 
however, relied on the risk owners, using their best judgement and experience, which means 
that the practice ended up combining the qualitative as well as the quantitative. This was, 
moreover, consistent with the PMBOK framework. In this sense, the risk consultants helped 
to make the PMBOK ‘pervasive and dominant in [the] everyday discourse of understanding’ 
(Ferraro et al., 2009, p. 671). This pervasiveness was well captured by the newly appointed 
risk expert after the project had incurred delays and increased costs and after the CEO, CFO, 
programme director and the risk consultants had resigned: ‘This time, we just have to do it 
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right’ (#I-24). The risk expert thus stressed the problems of implementing the PMBOK, not 
PMBOK itself. 
 
This article contributes to actor-network theory in two ways: One by developing our under-
standing of the power of experts for the cooling down of emerging ‘hot situations’; and, two, 
adding to our understanding of the performativity of (economic) theories (Callon, 1998a). The 
risk consultants delineated the boundaries of the construction of risks and were able to con-
tain, albeit only temporarily, the recurrent stream of overflows that emerged. It required costly 
investments, but through these investments – particularly through the power of the new IT-
based system’s visualisations – they managed, again temporarily, to re-actualise the predic-
tions of the PMBOK. Paraphrasing Mikes (2016), they attempted not to ‘[open] the door to 
dissonance and conflict’ (p. 263), but to ‘[keep] that door closed’. This finding points to the 
need for consultants to take on a more complex and advanced role as risk experts. It indicates 
that experts simultaneously co-produce the conditions for both stabilisation (the construction 
of pure risks) and destabilisation (the construction of impure risks). This renders the success-
ful performativity of frameworks and technologies an unending endeavour. It also shows that 
experts are not necessarily confined to doing nothing in hot situations, but can actually do 
something when they engage with non-experts. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Through the examination of a case study of a multi-billion-euro mega-project, this article has 
examined the long-term performative dynamics among a best-practice risk management 
framework, technologies of risk management and the translation of uncertainties into risks. 
The project’s risk management practice was organised around the well-known PMBOK 
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framework and an IT-based risk management control system programmed according to the 
PMBOK. 
 
The article argues that the PMBOK framework and the IT-based system performed the con-
struction of risks through establishing the boundaries of the forms of uncertainties that were 
accepted and thus included as risks. The accepted risks are labelled ‘pure risks’, conversely 
the excluded risks are labelled as ‘impure risks’. In explaining the dynamics of this framing, 
our article demonstrates that the IT-based system became a conduit for overflows, which ac-
tualised the prediction of PMBOK but also distorted that very same prediction. This dynamic 
occurred because the IT-based system generated concerns and frustrations from managers, 
who were troubled by having risk propositions excluded for being impure. In attempting to 
manage these emerging concerns, the consultants, who were operating the system, carried out 
a continual stream of readjustments. In association with the PMBOK framework, they mobi-
lised an entire series of mediators, such as inscriptions, which allowed them to purify the con-
struction of risks. This process was always provisional. The IT-based system, in particular, 
became key to purification because the risk consultants could visually frame the performable 
space of the practice. 
 
That the implementation of risk management is a complex, paradoxical and uncertain process 
is a central finding of this paper. Consequently, we suggest that more studies should pursue 
this line of enquiry. There is much to be learnt about how other projects and/or organisations 
construct risks. Similarly, it is fruitful to explore potential conflicts within consultancy com-
panies, particularly during hot situations, where blaming can emerge. A valuable direction for 
future research may be in examining the performativity of economic theories within the con-
texts of blame distribution more specifically (Skærbæk & Christensen, 2015). The examina-
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tion of how risk management interrelates with the broader conditions for managing projects 
and the ability to deliver projects according to budget, time plan and specifications is also 
something that merits further attention. One should be reflective about the effects that (eco-
nomic) frameworks and technologies as mediators produce, their assumptions and their use-
fulness for ensuring the success of projects and the everyday work of risk management. 
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